An agent satisfying the sufficient conditions for autonomy (Artemis) need not be a welfare subject.

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• The welfare good of nature fulfilment need not be realizable by a non-living autonomous agent like Artemis.claim0.867
  Alternative welfare goods may be inaccessible to Artemis.
• Autonomy can ground moral standing in the absence of welfare subjectivity.claim0.805
  Consequence of the pluralist view.
• Both welfare subjectivity and autonomy can confer moral status.claim0.801
  Central thesis of the paper.
• Being a welfare subject is sufficient for moral standing.claim0.790
  Plausible claim used as premise.
• The welfare good of knowledge may be inaccessible to an autonomous agent who has only credences, not full beliefs.claim0.785
  Alternative welfare goods may be inaccessible to Artemis.
• Contingent properties like composition, origin, or similarity to human brains should not define ethical consideration for novel agents.claim0.777
  Ethics must be based on empirically-determined cognitive properties (goals, preferences, concerns) rather than parochial markers.
• The conditions listed (rational reflection, normative/evaluative judgment, reasons-responsiveness, epistemic competence, right history) are jointly sufficient for autonomy.claim0.776
  Portrait of an autonomous agent for the argument.
• Consciousness alone does not explain the moral status of Vulcans; autonomous agency is needed.claim0.773
  Rejection of Chalmers' consciousness-only account.