An autonomous agent who lacks welfare subjectivity can nonetheless be wronged by acts that interfere with their self-government.

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• Autonomy does not entail welfare subjectivity.claim0.833
  Key premise that autonomy can exist without the capacity for welfare.
• Autonomy can ground moral standing in the absence of welfare subjectivity.claim0.829
  Consequence of the pluralist view.
• Both welfare subjectivity and autonomy can confer moral status.claim0.819
  Central thesis of the paper.
• The welfare good of knowledge may be inaccessible to an autonomous agent who has only credences, not full beliefs.claim0.803
  Alternative welfare goods may be inaccessible to Artemis.
• The welfare good of nature fulfilment need not be realizable by a non-living autonomous agent like Artemis.claim0.775
  Alternative welfare goods may be inaccessible to Artemis.
• Consciousness alone does not explain the moral status of Vulcans; autonomous agency is needed.claim0.759
  Rejection of Chalmers' consciousness-only account.
• Whether a state is rewarding (or not) is a function of the agent themselves, and not the environment.claim0.757
  §1, contrasting RL reward conceptualization.
• Autonomy as Welfare Goodconcept0.751
  The idea that autonomy itself is a welfare good, which may require substantive independence of mind.