The welfare good of nature fulfilment need not be realizable by a non-living autonomous agent like Artemis.

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• An agent satisfying the sufficient conditions for autonomy (Artemis) need not be a welfare subject.claim0.867
  Conclusion from the two premises.
• The welfare good of knowledge may be inaccessible to an autonomous agent who has only credences, not full beliefs.claim0.800
  Alternative welfare goods may be inaccessible to Artemis.
• An autonomous agent who lacks welfare subjectivity can nonetheless be wronged by acts that interfere with their self-government.claim0.775
  Central normative claim: autonomy grounds moral standing without welfare.
• Defining 'life' for agent ecologies requires explicit claim about adaptive responsiveness, compositional richness, or stewardship affordance.claim0.770
• Does it follow that Artemis must be a welfare subject?question0.769
  Key question in section 3.
• Autonomy as Welfare Goodconcept0.760
  The idea that autonomy itself is a welfare good, which may require substantive independence of mind.
• Whether a state is rewarding (or not) is a function of the agent themselves, and not the environment.claim0.759
  §1, contrasting RL reward conceptualization.
• Biology's robustness, open-endedness, evolvability, and unique complexity likely depend on the fact that evolution works with an agential material.claim0.757
  Central claim linking life's properties to the inherent competencies of its material substrate.