The welfare good of knowledge may be inaccessible to an autonomous agent who has only credences, not full beliefs.

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• An autonomous agent who lacks welfare subjectivity can nonetheless be wronged by acts that interfere with their self-government.claim0.803
  Central normative claim: autonomy grounds moral standing without welfare.
• The welfare good of nature fulfilment need not be realizable by a non-living autonomous agent like Artemis.claim0.800
  Alternative welfare goods may be inaccessible to Artemis.
• Knowledge as Welfare Goodconcept0.796
  The putative objective welfare good of knowledge, possibly inaccessible to agents without full beliefs.
• Autonomy as Welfare Goodconcept0.794
  The idea that autonomy itself is a welfare good, which may require substantive independence of mind.
• An agent satisfying the sufficient conditions for autonomy (Artemis) need not be a welfare subject.claim0.785
  Conclusion from the two premises.
• Autonomy can ground moral standing in the absence of welfare subjectivity.claim0.765
  Consequence of the pluralist view.
• Both welfare subjectivity and autonomy can confer moral status.claim0.761
  Central thesis of the paper.
• The simple fact that intelligent agents are collectives and do not continue unchanged fulfills a necessary requirement for an open-ended evolution of intelligence.claim0.755
  Connects collective intelligence to evolutionary potential.