Both welfare subjectivity and autonomy can confer moral status.

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• Autonomy can ground moral standing in the absence of welfare subjectivity.claim0.898
  Consequence of the pluralist view.
• Autonomy does not entail welfare subjectivity.claim0.882
  Key premise that autonomy can exist without the capacity for welfare.
• Being a welfare subject is sufficient for moral standing.claim0.832
  Plausible claim used as premise.
• An autonomous agent who lacks welfare subjectivity can nonetheless be wronged by acts that interfere with their self-government.claim0.819
  Central normative claim: autonomy grounds moral standing without welfare.
• An agent satisfying the sufficient conditions for autonomy (Artemis) need not be a welfare subject.claim0.801
  Conclusion from the two premises.
• Autonomy as Welfare Goodconcept0.799
  The idea that autonomy itself is a welfare good, which may require substantive independence of mind.
• Welfare Subjectivityconcept0.797
  The property of being a being whose life can go better or worse for them.
• If AI systems could experience happiness and suffering and set and pursue their own goals based on their own beliefs and desires, then they would very plausibly merit moral consideration.hypothesis0.787
  Joint sufficiency of consciousness and robust agency.