Being a welfare subject is sufficient for moral standing.

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• Both welfare subjectivity and autonomy can confer moral status.claim0.832
  Central thesis of the paper.
• Autonomy can ground moral standing in the absence of welfare subjectivity.claim0.823
  Consequence of the pluralist view.
• An agent satisfying the sufficient conditions for autonomy (Artemis) need not be a welfare subject.claim0.790
  Conclusion from the two premises.
• Does it follow that Artemis must be a welfare subject?question0.787
  Key question in section 3.
• What does it take to have moral standing?question0.776
  Central question of the paper.
• If an AI system could be a welfare subject and moral patient, then many model instances could be run after training, scaling up the problem rapidly.hypothesis0.776
  Scalability concern.
• Welfare Subjectivityconcept0.759
  The property of being a being whose life can go better or worse for them.
• Welfare considerations have a distinctive role in grounding positive obligations to aid, distinct from respect for autonomy.claim0.755
  Practical relevance of the welfare/autonomy distinction.