Once More, Without Feeling (Mogensen 2025)

• David Chalmers

  mentions
• William James

  mentions
  Philosopher cited for the principle 'thoughts are thinkers'—foundational to Levin's framework of active memory.
• Michael Graziano

  mentions
  Developer of attention schema theory, quoted on the 'cool' motivation for building conscious AI.
• Patrick Butlin

  mentions
• John Searle

  mentions
  Philosopher whose work on speech acts and intentionality McCarthy references; McCarthy discusses Searle's position on machine beliefs and promises.
• Shelly Kagan

  mentions
  Dissent from the necessity of consciousness for moral standing; also on welfare and ill-being.
• Andreas Mogensen

  authored
• Antonio Damasio

  mentions
• Derek Parfit

  mentions
  Reasons and persons; hybrid theories of welfare.
• Lisa Feldman Barrett

  mentions
  How Emotions Are Made; interoceptive basis of emotion.
• Peter Singer

  mentions
  Cited for the view that phenomenal consciousness is necessary for moral standing.
• Thomas Hurka

  mentions
  Perfectionism and objective list theory.
• Warren Quinn

  mentions
  Distinguished morality of respect from morality of humanity; introduced the radio man example.
• Alvin Goldman

  mentions
  Causal theory of action; critiqued for mechanistic assumptions.
• John Rawls

  mentions
  Desire-fulfilment theory of welfare (cited in context).
• Roderick Chisholm

  mentions
  Agent causation theorist; invoked for wayward causal chain problem and volitionalist account of action.
• Alfred Mele

  mentions
  Autonomous agents, self-control, and historical conditions on autonomy.
• Andrew Y. Lee

  mentions
  Consciousness makes things matter; degrees of consciousness; speciesism and sentientism.
• Angela Mendelovici

  mentions
  Co-author of article on phenomenal intentionality.
• Ben Bradley

  mentions
  Hedonism and well-being.
• Ben Bramble

  mentions
  Defense of hedonism about well-being.
• Benjamin Yelle

  mentions
  Value-fulfilment and well-being.
• Brad Hooker

  mentions
  Elements of well-being; objective list including autonomy.
• Brian Cutter

  mentions
  Metaphysical implications of the moral significance of consciousness.

+65 more

• Global workspace theory

  mentions
  Theory of consciousness involving a global workspace for information.
• Higher-Order Theory

  mentions
  A theory of consciousness on which mental states become conscious by being the objects of higher-order states.
• Desire-Fulfilment Theory

  mentions
  The theory of welfare that something is good for a person if and only if she desires it under the right conditions.
• Value-Fulfilment Theory

  mentions
  The theory of welfare on which something is good for a person if she values it under the right conditions, typically with affective dimensions.
• Non-Cognitivism

  mentions
  The view that normative/evaluative judgments are not robustly representational but may be analyzed as affective states.
• Pure Cognitivism

  mentions
  The view that emotions just are normative/evaluative judgments of a certain kind.
• A Posteriori Physicalism

  mentions
  The view that consciousness reduces to the physical via a posteriori identity statements; zombies are metaphysically impossible but conceptually possible.
• Epistemic Internalism

  mentions
  The view that epistemic justification is fully determined by factors internal to the subject's mind, often linked to consciousness.
• Hedonism

  mentions
  The theory of welfare that pleasure is the sole welfare good and pain the sole welfare bad.
• Humean Theory of Motivation

  mentions
  The view that motivating reasons consist of a desire and a means-end belief; desires and beliefs are distinct existences.
• Objective List Theory

  mentions
  The theory of welfare that there is a plurality of welfare goods, some independent of pro-attitudes.
• Perfectionism

  mentions
  The theory of welfare that the sole good is the development and exercise of essential capacities (nature fulfilment).
• Phenomenal Conservatism

  mentions
  The doctrine that any conscious seeming that p provides prima facie justification for believing p.
• Phenomenal Intentionality Hypothesis

  mentions
  The view that all intentional content derives from phenomenal consciousness, implying conscious experience for intentional states.
• Pluralist Theory of Moral Standing

  introduces
  The author's view that both welfare subjectivity and autonomy can confer moral standing.
• Process Reliabilism

  mentions
  An externalist theory of epistemic justification where justified beliefs are produced by reliable processes.

• Consciousness (phenomenal consciousness)

  mentions
  The state of having subjective experiences; there is something it is like to be the subject.
• Welfare Subjectivity

  mentions
  The property of being a being whose life can go better or worse for them.
• Autonomy

  mentions
  A psychological capacity for self-government, enabling an individual to be the author of her own thoughts and actions.
• Moral Standing

  mentions
  The property of mattering morally in one's own right, meriting concern and respect.
• Autonomous AI Systems

  mentions
  Future AI that may be rational, autonomous, and possibly conscious but lack affective consciousness.
• Affective States

  mentions
  Psychological states like emotions, moods, pains, itches, defined by valence and arousal.
• Morality of Humanity

  mentions
  System of obligations concerned with promoting others' welfare.
• Morality of Respect

  mentions
  System of obligations that stem from recognition of the authority of rational agents to direct their own lives.
• Rational Reflection

  mentions
  The capacity to determine behaviour based on reflective normative/evaluative judgment.
• Reasons-responsiveness

  mentions
  The capacity to be substantively rational and respond appropriately to reasons.
• Vulcan

  mentions
  A conscious creature capable of intellectual and moral goals but incapable of affective states, used by Chalmers to test moral standing.
• Artemis

  mentions
  A placeholder autonomous agent (alien or robot) used to illustrate sufficient conditions for autonomy without welfare subjectivity.
• Autonomy as Welfare Good

  mentions
  The idea that autonomy itself is a welfare good, which may require substantive independence of mind.
• Credences

  mentions
  Graded doxastic attitudes distinct from full belief, which might not suffice for knowledge.
• Doxastic Justification

  mentions
  The justification of a belief itself, often externalist, not necessarily linked to consciousness.
• Epistemic Competence

  mentions
  The ability to gain relevant empirical information about the world and options.
• Higher-order Desires

  mentions
  Desires through which an agent identifies with some first-order desires and repudiates others.
• Historical Condition on Autonomy

  mentions
  The requirement that an autonomous agent lacks certain forms of manipulation in her past.
• Interest

  mentions
  Something that benefits or harms a being; tied to welfare subjectivity.
• Knowledge as Welfare Good

  mentions
  The putative objective welfare good of knowledge, possibly inaccessible to agents without full beliefs.
• Nature Fulfilment

  mentions
  The perfectionist welfare good of developing and exercising the essential capacities of one's nature.
• Normative/Evaluative Judgment

  mentions
  Mental states that guide behaviour via assessments of what is good, right, or rational.
• Paternalism

  mentions
  Interference with a person's autonomy for their own benefit.
• Personal Justification

  mentions
  The sense in which a person is justified in holding a belief, tied to phenomenal consciousness.

+4 more

• Autonomy does not entail welfare subjectivity.

  cites
  Key premise that autonomy can exist without the capacity for welfare.
• Both welfare subjectivity and autonomy can confer moral status.

  cites
  Central thesis of the paper.
• Philosophical debates about the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and moral standing need to engage with neglected questions about the nature of autonomy and its possible links to consciousness.

  cites
  Call for philosophical attention to autonomy-consciousness links.
• There are metaphysically and/or nomologically possible beings who fall outside the scope of the morality of humanity and are protected only by the morality of respect.

  cites
  Existence of autonomous non-welfare subjects with moral standing via respect.
• Autonomy can ground moral standing in the absence of welfare subjectivity.

  cites
  Consequence of the pluralist view.
• Being a welfare subject is sufficient for moral standing.

  cites
  Plausible claim used as premise.