claim
active
claim:autonomy-does-not-entail-welfare-subjectivityAutonomy does not entail welfare subjectivity.
Key premise that autonomy can exist without the capacity for welfare.
Neighborhood — ranked by edge-count
Artifacts (1)
artifact
- The working paper itself, presenting a pluralist theory of moral standing and arguing that autonomy can ground moral standing without welfare subjectivity.
Claims (1)
claim
- An agent satisfying the sufficient conditions for autonomy (Artemis) need not be a welfare subject.supportsConclusion from the two premises.
Related by similarity (8)
cosine ≥ 0.65 · no typed edgeEntities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.
- Central thesis of the paper.
- Consequence of the pluralist view.
- Central normative claim: autonomy grounds moral standing without welfare.
- The idea that autonomy itself is a welfare good, which may require substantive independence of mind.
- The property of being a being whose life can go better or worse for them.
- Second premise showing autonomy does not entail welfare subjectivity.
- Practical relevance of the welfare/autonomy distinction.
- Reply to the objection that respect presupposes welfare subjectivity.