The conditions sufficient for autonomy do not entail a capacity for affective states.

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• A capacity for affective states is necessary for accruing welfare goods and bads.claim0.871
  First premise showing autonomy does not entail welfare subjectivity.
• The conditions listed (rational reflection, normative/evaluative judgment, reasons-responsiveness, epistemic competence, right history) are jointly sufficient for autonomy.claim0.820
  Portrait of an autonomous agent for the argument.
• Autonomy does not entail welfare subjectivity.claim0.784
  Key premise that autonomy can exist without the capacity for welfare.
• There are no a priori limits on a self's perceptions of stress and thus no limits on capacity for care and intelligent response.hypothesis0.768
  Predicts that collective, dynamic nature of intelligent agents enables open-ended evolution without fixed essence.
• Autonomy can ground moral standing in the absence of welfare subjectivity.claim0.762
  Consequence of the pluralist view.
• There are plausible views (e.g., global workspace theory, higher-order theory) on which autonomy entails phenomenal consciousness.claim0.760
  Tentative conclusion on the autonomy-consciousness link.
• Historical Condition on Autonomyconcept0.758
  The requirement that an autonomous agent lacks certain forms of manipulation in her past.
• The scope of states that an agent can be stressed about defines its degree of cognitive capacity.claim0.756
  Stress expands the spatial, temporal, and complexity scale of goals.