The conditions listed (rational reflection, normative/evaluative judgment, reasons-responsiveness, epistemic competence, right history) are jointly sufficient for autonomy.

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• The conditions sufficient for autonomy do not entail a capacity for affective states.claim0.820
  Second premise showing autonomy does not entail welfare subjectivity.
• Personal justification (and thus epistemic rationality) requires phenomenal consciousness.claim0.776
  A route to showing autonomy may entail consciousness.
• An agent satisfying the sufficient conditions for autonomy (Artemis) need not be a welfare subject.claim0.776
  Conclusion from the two premises.
• Philosophical debates about the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and moral standing need to engage with neglected questions about the nature of autonomy and its possible links to consciousness.claim0.768
  Call for philosophical attention to autonomy-consciousness links.
• There are plausible views (e.g., global workspace theory, higher-order theory) on which autonomy entails phenomenal consciousness.claim0.766
  Tentative conclusion on the autonomy-consciousness link.
• Autonomy can ground moral standing in the absence of welfare subjectivity.claim0.766
  Consequence of the pluralist view.
• Both welfare subjectivity and autonomy can confer moral status.claim0.764
  Central thesis of the paper.
• Contingent properties like composition, origin, or similarity to human brains should not define ethical consideration for novel agents.claim0.762
  Ethics must be based on empirically-determined cognitive properties (goals, preferences, concerns) rather than parochial markers.