Autonomy can ground moral standing in the absence of welfare subjectivity.

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• Both welfare subjectivity and autonomy can confer moral status.claim0.898
  Central thesis of the paper.
• Autonomy does not entail welfare subjectivity.claim0.868
  Key premise that autonomy can exist without the capacity for welfare.
• An autonomous agent who lacks welfare subjectivity can nonetheless be wronged by acts that interfere with their self-government.claim0.829
  Central normative claim: autonomy grounds moral standing without welfare.
• Being a welfare subject is sufficient for moral standing.claim0.823
  Plausible claim used as premise.
• Obligations grounded in respect for autonomy are independent in principle of concern for others' welfare.claim0.818
  Premise for the argument from humanity.
• An agent satisfying the sufficient conditions for autonomy (Artemis) need not be a welfare subject.claim0.805
  Conclusion from the two premises.
• Welfare considerations have a distinctive role in grounding positive obligations to aid, distinct from respect for autonomy.claim0.794
  Practical relevance of the welfare/autonomy distinction.
• Autonomy as Welfare Goodconcept0.790
  The idea that autonomy itself is a welfare good, which may require substantive independence of mind.