Obligations grounded in respect for autonomy are independent in principle of concern for others' welfare.

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• Welfare considerations have a distinctive role in grounding positive obligations to aid, distinct from respect for autonomy.claim0.834
  Practical relevance of the welfare/autonomy distinction.
• Respect for autonomy is not just a matter of respecting each person's ability to pursue their own conception of the good life.claim0.821
  Reply to the objection that respect presupposes welfare subjectivity.
• Autonomy can ground moral standing in the absence of welfare subjectivity.claim0.818
  Consequence of the pluralist view.
• Autonomy does not entail welfare subjectivity.claim0.763
  Key premise that autonomy can exist without the capacity for welfare.
• What type 1 and type 2 obligations are, e.g. the legal requirements they impose, how they are to be treated when they conflict with other considerations, and the consequences of their non-fulfillment, is subject to institutional definition.claim0.762
  Claim that obligation types are institution-dependent.
• We must develop principled approaches to evaluating the sentience of (and thus, our responsibility to) beings of unfamiliar provenance and composition.claim0.758
  Call to action for new frameworks.
• Crump et al. (2022) offer a well-argued example of an essential development: a rigorous framework for assessing sentience from the perspective of moral concern over an agent's welfare.claim0.755
  Levin's endorsement of the target paper's contribution.
• An agent satisfying the sufficient conditions for autonomy (Artemis) need not be a welfare subject.claim0.755
  Conclusion from the two premises.