A capacity for affective states is necessary for accruing welfare goods and bads.

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• The conditions sufficient for autonomy do not entail a capacity for affective states.claim0.871
  Second premise showing autonomy does not entail welfare subjectivity.
• What degree of concern and care should we exhibit toward the many diverse agents around us, and what criteria do we use to identify sentience, capacity for suffering, and other properties that have moral implications?question0.752
  Central question motivating the paper.
• Affective Statesconcept0.751
  Psychological states like emotions, moods, pains, itches, defined by valence and arousal.
• Cognitive capacities exist on a spectrum and tools from behavioral sciences can be productively applied to understand and control systems far beyond familiar animals with central nervous systems.claim0.750
  Core tenet of diverse intelligence; justifies the methodological borrowing across fields.
• The scope of states that an agent can be stressed about defines its degree of cognitive capacity.claim0.742
  Stress expands the spatial, temporal, and complexity scale of goals.
• Both welfare subjectivity and autonomy can confer moral status.claim0.742
  Central thesis of the paper.
• Whether a state is rewarding (or not) is a function of the agent themselves, and not the environment.claim0.742
  §1, contrasting RL reward conceptualization.
• A system's capacity for care constitutes its self in the absence of permanent substance or essence.claim0.740
  Foundational to selfless-self model; self defined by scope and nature of goals pursued, not by enduring essence.