framework
active
framework:phenomenal-intentionality-hypothesisPhenomenal Intentionality Hypothesis
The view that all intentional content derives from phenomenal consciousness, implying conscious experience for intentional states.
Neighborhood — ranked by edge-count
Artifacts (1)
artifact
- The working paper itself, presenting a pluralist theory of moral standing and arguing that autonomy can ground moral standing without welfare subjectivity.
Related by similarity (8)
cosine ≥ 0.65 · no typed edgeEntities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.
- Metzinger's concept from Being No One noted as possibly anticipating Attention Schema Theory by a decade
- The capacity to have beliefs, desires, intentions; discussed in the context of AI and speech acts.
- The hypothesis that analogous features and circuits reliably form across different neural network models and tasks
- Crane's philosophical position that aboutness/intentionality defines mental phenomena; contested by biogenic approaches.
- The presence of arbitrary idea and image in design that distorts the unfolding process.
- The hypothesis that successful RL agents will display causal emergence that is predictive of final reward early in training and whose representational dynamics align with reward improvement.
- The conjecture that consciousness does not result from the organized mind but creates and maintains complex models of reality; forms at the beginning of mental development
- CIMC's central hypothesis: general computational machines with sufficient resources possess the necessary and sufficient means to implement consciousness, verifiable through internal structure analysis