claim
active
claim:intentionality-as-the-mark-of-the-mentalIntentionality as the mark of the mental
Crane's philosophical position that aboutness/intentionality defines mental phenomena; contested by biogenic approaches.
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- All minds are composites of parts; individual and collective intelligence unified under substrate-neutral principles.
- Explores how cognition and intentionality emerge through self-organizing biological processes, shared between living and artificial systems.
Claims (1)
claim
- Core claim of biogenic approach: cognition is not unique to brains or nervous systems but emerges from living organization itself.
Related by similarity (8)
cosine ≥ 0.65 · no typed edgeEntities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.
- The capacity to have beliefs, desires, intentions; discussed in the context of AI and speech acts.
- The presence of arbitrary idea and image in design that distorts the unfolding process.
- Central explanatory target: behavior constrained by prior intentions and contextual constraints that emerge from cognitive reorganization.
- Metzinger's concept from Being No One noted as possibly anticipating Attention Schema Theory by a decade
- The view that all intentional content derives from phenomenal consciousness, implying conscious experience for intentional states.
- Capacity to set and pursue goals via beliefs, desires, and intentions.
- Dennett's framework adopted and extended by TAME to make agency attribution empirical and observer-dependent.
- Driving question for Part I; answered by appeal to whether behavior originated in and was constrained by prior intention.