Intentional Stance

Dennett's framework adopted and extended by TAME to make agency attribution empirical and observer-dependent.

Neighborhood — ranked by edge-count

thinker

Daniel Dennett
associated_withintroduces
Philosopher whose Intentional Stance is adapted and extended by TAME framework.

concept

Persuadability Continuum
associated_with
A spectrum from systems controllable only by physical intervention to systems controllable by rational argument; proposed as a continuous measure replacing binary life/machine distinction
design stance
subtype_of
Dennett's approach to understanding systems by their design, applied to speech acts.

framework

Tame Technological Approach To Mind Everywhere
extends
A conceptual framework for understanding cognition and intelligence across diverse substrates—including evolved biological systems, artificial systems, and bioengineered systems—using empirically-grounded, gradualist approaches. TTAME enables comparative analysis of mind-like phenomena regardless of the physical or biological substrate in which it emerges, facilitating cross-disciplinary study of unconventional intelligences.
Axis Of Persuadability
extends
Practical engineering framework for determining optimal level of control for a given system, from brute force to rational argument.

cosine ≥ 0.65 · no typed edge

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

Intentional Actionconcept0.822
Central explanatory target: behavior constrained by prior intentions and contextual constraints that emerge from cognitive reorganization.
intentionalityconcept0.803
The capacity to have beliefs, desires, intentions; discussed in the context of AI and speech acts.
intentional natureconcept0.773
The presence of arbitrary idea and image in design that distorts the unfolding process.
Intentional Agencyconcept0.765
Capacity to set and pursue goals via beliefs, desires, and intentions.
Intentionality as the mark of the mentalclaim0.741
Crane's philosophical position that aboutness/intentionality defines mental phenomena; contested by biogenic approaches.
What distinguishes intentional action from mere behavior or accident?question0.729
Driving question for Part I; answered by appeal to whether behavior originated in and was constrained by prior intention.
intentconcept0.726
The set of attributes B of a formal concept (A,B).
actionconcept0.715
Changing configuration to sample environment differently; minimizes free energy.