Consciousness alone does not explain the moral status of Vulcans; autonomous agency is needed.

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• Zombies (unconscious physical duplicates of humans) would have a very different moral status from Vulcans, possibly none.claim0.809
  A challenge for views that make autonomy sufficient for moral standing.
• Both welfare subjectivity and autonomy can confer moral status.claim0.778
  Central thesis of the paper.
• Can Consciousness And Moral Status Be Attributed Toquestion0.778
• An agent satisfying the sufficient conditions for autonomy (Artemis) need not be a welfare subject.claim0.773
  Conclusion from the two premises.
• There are plausible views (e.g., global workspace theory, higher-order theory) on which autonomy entails phenomenal consciousness.claim0.765
  Tentative conclusion on the autonomy-consciousness link.
• Autonomy can ground moral standing in the absence of welfare subjectivity.claim0.760
  Consequence of the pluralist view.
• Philosophical debates about the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and moral standing need to engage with neglected questions about the nature of autonomy and its possible links to consciousness.claim0.759
  Call for philosophical attention to autonomy-consciousness links.
• An autonomous agent who lacks welfare subjectivity can nonetheless be wronged by acts that interfere with their self-government.claim0.759
  Central normative claim: autonomy grounds moral standing without welfare.