It would be wrong to kill or destroy a being like Artemis (a Vulcan) without her consent for the sake of a trivial good.

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• An agent satisfying the sufficient conditions for autonomy (Artemis) need not be a welfare subject.claim0.743
  Conclusion from the two premises.
• Consciousness alone does not explain the moral status of Vulcans; autonomous agency is needed.claim0.736
  Rejection of Chalmers' consciousness-only account.
• Zombies (unconscious physical duplicates of humans) would have a very different moral status from Vulcans, possibly none.claim0.736
  A challenge for views that make autonomy sufficient for moral standing.
• The welfare good of nature fulfilment need not be realizable by a non-living autonomous agent like Artemis.claim0.735
  Alternative welfare goods may be inaccessible to Artemis.
• Does it follow that Artemis must be a welfare subject?question0.710
  Key question in section 3.
• There are metaphysically and/or nomologically possible beings who fall outside the scope of the morality of humanity and are protected only by the morality of respect.claim0.707
  Existence of autonomous non-welfare subjects with moral standing via respect.
• Are there metaphysically and/or nomologically possible beings who fall outside the scope of the morality of humanity and are protected only by the morality of respect?question0.701
  Guiding question of the investigation.
• It’s wrong of you to paternalistically add meat to your vegan housemate’s lentil stew in small quantities she can’t detect.quote0.699
  Illustrates that respect for autonomy extends beyond prudential preferences to ethical convictions.