claim

active

claim:computational-functionalism-is-plausible-and-well-supported-so-it-would-be-a-mistake-to-dismiss-near-future-ai-welfare-solely-on-the-basis-of-high-level-arguments-against-this-assumption

Computational functionalism is plausible and well-supported, so it would be a mistake to dismiss near-future AI welfare solely on the basis of high-level arguments against this assumption.

Defense against biological substrate objections.

Source paper

extracted_from

Taking AI Welfare Seriously

(2024) · Robert Long · Jeff Sebo · Patrick Butlin · Kathleen Finlinson +6

Neighborhood — ranked by edge-count

Findings (2)

finding

Bourget and Chalmers 2020 survey: ~39% of philosophers accept or lean toward future AI consciousness
supports
Survey result on philosophical attitudes toward AI consciousness.
Francken et al. 2022 survey of ASSC members: only 3% responded 'no' to machines having consciousness
supports
Survey result showing widespread expert openness to machine consciousness.

Communities (2)

community

Alive AI interface ethics & design
members_of
Explores aliveness, aesthetics, welfare, and ethical responsibility in AI interaction design.
Near-term AI consciousness and moral patienthood
members_of
Examines plausibility of machine consciousness in coming years and associated ethical obligations, grounded in computational functionalism arguments.

Related by similarity (8)

cosine ≥ 0.65 · no typed edge

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

If computational functionalism is true, conscious AI systems could realistically be built in the near term.hypothesis0.842
Conditional prediction about the feasibility of conscious AI.
If computational functionalism is correct, then some computations suffice for consciousness and the question is which ones and when they will exist in AI.hypothesis0.836
Conditional underlying the consciousness route.
We adopt computational functionalism as a working hypothesis.claim0.835
Assumption that implementing the right computations is necessary and sufficient for consciousness.
If computational functionalism is false, consciousness may be impossible in non-organic artificial systems.hypothesis0.807
Contrapositive possibility acknowledged.
We hypothesize that general computational machines with sufficient resources possess the necessary and sufficient means to implement consciousness, and that successful implementation can be established via analysis or testing.hypothesis0.780
The central hypothesis of the paper
The Machine Consciousness Hypothesis rests on metaphysical assumptions summarized as computationalist functionalism, which is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the hypothesis.claim0.769
Paper's statement of the metaphysical presuppositions of the MCH
Engineering digital mind preferences to support human incumbents may be permissible because programmers inevitably make choices when building AI and there may be no default to defer to, unlike human reproductionclaim0.767
Addresses the procedural ethics of creating digital minds disposed to protect human interests
Computational Functionalismframework0.766
Hypothesis that some class of computations suffices for consciousness; central assumption for AI consciousness route.