If computational functionalism is correct, then some computations suffice for consciousness and the question is which ones and when they will exist in AI.

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• If computational functionalism is false, consciousness may be impossible in non-organic artificial systems.hypothesis0.878
  Contrapositive possibility acknowledged.
• We hypothesize that general computational machines with sufficient resources possess the necessary and sufficient means to implement consciousness, and that successful implementation can be established via analysis or testing.hypothesis0.876
  The central hypothesis of the paper
• If computational functionalism is true, conscious AI systems could realistically be built in the near term.hypothesis0.872
  Conditional prediction about the feasibility of conscious AI.
• What computational function does consciousness serve, and what functional organization is sufficient for its presence?question0.847
  Opening motivating question addressed by the paper's thesis
• General computational machines with sufficient resources possess the necessary and sufficient means to implement consciousnesshypothesis0.843
  CIMC's central testable hypothesis grounding the entire research program
• The Machine Consciousness Hypothesis rests on metaphysical assumptions summarized as computationalist functionalism, which is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the hypothesis.claim0.842
  Paper's statement of the metaphysical presuppositions of the MCH
• Consciousness in AI is best assessed by drawing on neuroscientific theories of consciousness.claim0.842
  Central methodological claim of the paper.
• We adopt computational functionalism as a working hypothesis.claim0.840
  Assumption that implementing the right computations is necessary and sufficient for consciousness.