hypothesis
active
hypothesis:if-computational-functionalism-is-false-consciousness-may-be-impossible-in-non-organic-artificial-systemsIf computational functionalism is false, consciousness may be impossible in non-organic artificial systems.
Contrapositive possibility acknowledged.
Source paper
extracted_from(2023) · Patrick Butlin · Robert P. Long · Eric Elmoznino · Yoshua Bengio +15
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Papers (1)
paper
Related by similarity (8)
cosine ≥ 0.65 · no typed edgeEntities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.
- Core claim enabling the indicator method's relevance to current AI systems
- Conditional underlying the consciousness route.
- If computational functionalism is true, conscious AI systems could realistically be built in the near term.hypothesis0.853Conditional prediction about the feasibility of conscious AI.
- Paper's argument that all viable theories of consciousness implicitly rely on structural-functional criteria
- The paper's core methodological bet: use computational functionalism as a working assumption even while remaining agnostic about its truth
- Paper's statement of the metaphysical presuppositions of the MCH
- The central hypothesis of the paper
- will different systems facing similar computational problems converge to similar solutions, including consciousness?question0.813Key question for the Machine Consciousness Hypothesis and the universality hypothesis extension