claim

active

claim:it-is-hard-to-coherently-deny-functionalism-in-any-reasonable-theory-of-consciousness-since-any-theory-must-tie-consciousness-to-certain-configurations-which-smuggles-functionalism-back-in

It is hard to coherently deny functionalism in any reasonable theory of consciousness, since any theory must tie consciousness to certain configurations, which smuggles functionalism back in.

Paper's argument that all viable theories of consciousness implicitly rely on structural-functional criteria

Source paper

extracted_from

The Machine Consciousness Hypothesis

Neighborhood — ranked by edge-count

Frameworks (1)

framework

Functionalism
supports
Epistemological position that what any phenomenon is is its causal/operational role; rejects hidden essence; foundational to CIMC's stance

Related by similarity (8)

cosine ≥ 0.65 · no typed edge

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

If computational functionalism is false, consciousness may be impossible in non-organic artificial systems.hypothesis0.837
Contrapositive possibility acknowledged.
If computational functionalism is correct, then some computations suffice for consciousness and the question is which ones and when they will exist in AI.hypothesis0.815
Conditional underlying the consciousness route.
The operations and functional principles of most contemporary theories of consciousness are not confined to neural substrates.finding0.814
Primary empirical result from comparative analysis of major consciousness theories.
Consciousness remains without an agreed scientific characterization, without a validated theory connecting mechanism to experience, and without criteria for establishing its presence or absence in any systemclaim0.813
CIMC's characterization of the current state of the field motivating its research program
Most theories of consciousness are already substrate-neutral; neurocentric readings are convention, not content commitment.claim0.806
Mainstream theories of consciousness are already substrate-neutral at the primitive level.claim0.806
The functionalist denies the coherence of philosophical zombies: experience, insofar as it has any determinable character, is itself a functional propertyclaim0.803
Core argument against essentialism: there is no property of consciousness over and above its functional manifestations
We hypothesize that general computational machines with sufficient resources possess the necessary and sufficient means to implement consciousness, and that successful implementation can be established via analysis or testing.hypothesis0.802
The central hypothesis of the paper