claim

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claim:the-functionalist-denies-the-coherence-of-philosophical-zombies-experience-insofar-as-it-has-any-determinable-character-is-itself-a-functional-property

The functionalist denies the coherence of philosophical zombies: experience, insofar as it has any determinable character, is itself a functional property

Core argument against essentialism: there is no property of consciousness over and above its functional manifestations

Source paper

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cimcWhitepaper

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Concepts (1)

concept

Philosophical Zombie
contradicts
A system functionally identical to a conscious being but lacking phenomenal experience; used in conceivability arguments against functionalism

Related by similarity (8)

cosine ≥ 0.65 · no typed edge

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

Functional and phenomenal introspection are distinguishable, and whether they correlate in machines is an open question.claim0.806
Core conceptual distinction introduced at the start; defines the paper's central problem.
It is hard to coherently deny functionalism in any reasonable theory of consciousness, since any theory must tie consciousness to certain configurations, which smuggles functionalism back in.claim0.803
Paper's argument that all viable theories of consciousness implicitly rely on structural-functional criteria
The philosophical zombie is incoherent by analogy: claiming zombie electrons — particles that behave identically to real electrons but are not 'actually' electrons — makes no sense, because 'electron' just names observable properties.claim0.798
Paper's refutation of philosophical zombie concept via functionalist analogy
TAME does not claim that mind is inevitably baked in regardless of physical implementation; causal structure and cybernetic properties are key determinants.claim0.771
Distinguishes TAME from panpsychist views; emphasizes role of organization.
If computational functionalism is false, consciousness may be impossible in non-organic artificial systems.hypothesis0.769
Contrapositive possibility acknowledged.
There are plausible views (e.g., global workspace theory, higher-order theory) on which autonomy entails phenomenal consciousness.claim0.765
Tentative conclusion on the autonomy-consciousness link.
Aliveness is a property of multi-scale coherence under transformation, not a property of substrate—making it substrate-neutral.claim0.761
Personal justification (and thus epistemic rationality) requires phenomenal consciousness.claim0.761
A route to showing autonomy may entail consciousness.