We adopt computational functionalism as a working hypothesis.

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• If computational functionalism is correct, then some computations suffice for consciousness and the question is which ones and when they will exist in AI.hypothesis0.840
  Conditional underlying the consciousness route.
• Computational functionalism is plausible and well-supported, so it would be a mistake to dismiss near-future AI welfare solely on the basis of high-level arguments against this assumption.claim0.835
  Defense against biological substrate objections.
• If computational functionalism is false, consciousness may be impossible in non-organic artificial systems.hypothesis0.803
  Contrapositive possibility acknowledged.
• Computationalist Functionalismframework0.802
  Combined epistemological stance that everything knowable about systems including consciousness is a function of observable behaviors of finite state machines
• The Machine Consciousness Hypothesis rests on metaphysical assumptions summarized as computationalist functionalism, which is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the hypothesis.claim0.801
  Paper's statement of the metaphysical presuppositions of the MCH
• If computational functionalism is true, conscious AI systems could realistically be built in the near term.hypothesis0.800
  Conditional prediction about the feasibility of conscious AI.
• We hypothesize that general computational machines with sufficient resources possess the necessary and sufficient means to implement consciousness, and that successful implementation can be established via analysis or testing.hypothesis0.781
  The central hypothesis of the paper
• Computationalismframework0.774
  Position that all phenomena can be fully captured as discrete and finite state transitions; grounded in mathematical constructivism