claim

active

claim:the-notion-of-machine-used-to-claim-living-things-are-not-machines-refers-to-an-outdated-definition-that-no-longer-fits

The notion of 'machine' used to claim living things are not machines refers to an outdated definition that no longer fits.

First central claim of the paper: the machine concept used in organicist critiques is historically contingent, not essential

Source paper

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Living Things Are Not (20th Century) Machines: Updating Mechanism Metaphors in Light of the Modern Science of Machine Behavior

(2021) · Joshua Bongard · Michael Levin

Neighborhood — ranked by edge-count

Findings (1)

finding

Planarian flatworms contain voltage patterns in non-neural cells that are re-writable latent pattern memories guiding future regenerative anatomy, editable without touching the genome.
supports
Key empirical result demonstrating a sharp distinction between the cellular machine and the data it uses, analogous to false memory inception

Frameworks (1)

framework

Nicholson Four Features of Machines
contradicts
Nicholson's four necessary features of machines (specificity, constraint, efficiency, non-continuity) used as the foil that the paper systematically refutes

Claims (1)

claim

Self-similarity and multi-scale competency currently remain a real feature that distinguishes living systems from machines, though there is no deep reason preventing engineered artifacts from exploiting it.
extends
The one property the authors acknowledge still distinguishes life from machines, but frame as contingent not essential

Questions (1)

question

What is an appropriate definition of 'machine,' and does it apply to all, some, or no living forms across the tree of life?
gates
Foundational definitional question motivating the entire paper

Related by similarity (8)

cosine ≥ 0.65 · no typed edge

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

What is an appropriate definition of machine, and does it apply to all, some, or no living forms?question0.862
Central interrogative driving the paper's entire argumentative structure.
Living things are not 20th-century machines, but may be 21st-century machines.claim0.848
Core thesis: the machine metaphor requires updating, not abandoning, in light of modern machine behavior.
Machines can now make machines.claim0.822
Evolutionary algorithms and self-organizing systems blur distinction between evolved and designed.
The life vs. machine distinction is relevant only to the lowest class of machines available in prior decades and is not fundamental.claim0.811
Claim that the organism–machine dichotomy is outdated.
Physicality is not a requirement for a machine; a machine learning algorithm that generates other machine learning algorithms or designs robots qualifies as a machine.claim0.804
Proposed definitional update removing physicality as a necessary condition for machines
Living cells and tissues are not really machines; but then again, nothing is really anything – all metaphors are wrong, but some are more useful than others.claim0.801
Concluding pragmatic epistemology: the machine metaphor's value is heuristic, not ontological
The material implementation and back-story of a given system are not sufficient information to reliably place it into a category of machine vs. living being.claim0.798
Core ontological claim: composition and origin story are contingent, not essential, classifiers
Progress in theory and practice requires a novel conception of 'machines as they could be,' based on the profound lessons of biology at all scales.claim0.793
The paper's overarching constructive goal, paralleling Langton's 'life as it could be'