claim
active
claim:physicality-is-not-a-requirement-for-a-machine-a-machine-learning-algorithm-that-generates-other-machine-learning-algorithms-or-designs-robots-qualifies-as-a-machinePhysicality is not a requirement for a machine; a machine learning algorithm that generates other machine learning algorithms or designs robots qualifies as a machine.
Proposed definitional update removing physicality as a necessary condition for machines
Source paper
extracted_from(2021) · Joshua Bongard · Michael Levin
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Claims (1)
claim
- The paper's proposed new definition of 'machine' that includes domesticated organisms and synthetic organisms
Related by similarity (8)
cosine ≥ 0.65 · no typed edgeEntities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.
- First central claim of the paper: the machine concept used in organicist critiques is historically contingent, not essential
- General computational machines with sufficient resources possess the necessary and sufficient means to implement consciousnesshypothesis0.799CIMC's central testable hypothesis grounding the entire research program
- The central hypothesis of the paper
- Evolutionary algorithms and self-organizing systems blur distinction between evolved and designed.
- Russell's statement opening Section 2 articulating the core motivation for the Contemplative AI approach
- What is an appropriate definition of machine, and does it apply to all, some, or no living forms?question0.786Central interrogative driving the paper's entire argumentative structure.
- The paper's overarching constructive goal, paralleling Langton's 'life as it could be'
- Core ontological claim: composition and origin story are contingent, not essential, classifiers