claim
active
claim:living-cells-and-tissues-are-not-really-machines-but-then-again-nothing-is-really-anything-all-metaphors-are-wrong-but-some-are-more-useful-than-othersLiving cells and tissues are not really machines; but then again, nothing is really anything – all metaphors are wrong, but some are more useful than others.
Concluding pragmatic epistemology: the machine metaphor's value is heuristic, not ontological
Source paper
extracted_from(2021) · Joshua Bongard · Michael Levin
Related by similarity (8)
cosine ≥ 0.65 · no typed edgeEntities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.
- First central claim of the paper: the machine concept used in organicist critiques is historically contingent, not essential
- Core thesis: the machine metaphor requires updating, not abandoning, in light of modern machine behavior.
- Core ontological claim: composition and origin story are contingent, not essential, classifiers
- Strong claim that hybridization is unlimited in principle, making the life/machine binary conceptually untenable
- Positions living process as an refined version of innate human creativity, not an artificial imposition.
- Core definition of living process as intentionally form-creating, in contrast to fragmented modern processes.
- Claim that the organism–machine dichotomy is outdated.
- Essential feature of living process, making phenomenological experience the central criterion for evaluation.