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concept:the-constraints-under-which-second-order-perception-leads-to-phenomenology-are-not-yet-fully-developedThe constraints under which second-order perception leads to phenomenology are not yet fully developed
CIMC acknowledges the constraints on second-order perception that produce phenomenology are beyond the current whitepaper's scope
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Papers (1)
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Related by similarity (8)
cosine ≥ 0.65 · no typed edgeEntities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.
- CIMC's proposed computational structure of consciousness: perception that perception is occurring, non-inferential and synchronous with its content
- Paper's core phenomenological definition of consciousness
- Load-bearing characterization of how prior intention forms as phase transition in cognitive dynamics; core mechanism of action.
- Core resolution claim: phenomenal experience and its functional role coincide; resolving this is key to closing the Hard Problem
- Alexander's reconciliation: Cartesian method for machine-like phenomena, wholeness method for relative wholeness judgments
- Alignment with Crump et al. that metacognition is too high a bar.
- The paper's claim that theoretical convergence across GWT, RPT, HOT, IIT makes the findings non-coincidental