claim

active

claim:consciousness-phenomenologically-understood-is-second-order-perception-not-just-registration-of-content-but-the-additional-perception-that-perception-is-taking-place

Consciousness, phenomenologically understood, is second-order perception: not just registration of content, but the additional perception that perception is taking place.

Paper's core phenomenological definition of consciousness

Source paper

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The Machine Consciousness Hypothesis

Neighborhood — ranked by edge-count

Frameworks (1)

framework

Human Consciousness Hypothesis
supports
Component of MCH stating consciousness is a specific dynamic representation in the human mind characterizable by phenomenology and functionality

Related by similarity (8)

cosine ≥ 0.65 · no typed edge

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

Consciousness is not prediction error resolution as such but the second-order perception that orchestrates coherence across models being maintained and updatedclaim0.847
CIMC's differentiation from predictive processing: specifying which pattern within predictive processing constitutes consciousness
Consciousness is not the global broadcast itself but the second-order perception that orchestrates coherence across representations competing for and achieving global accessclaim0.837
CIMC's differentiation of its account from GWT: it explains the dynamics underlying GWT rather than equating consciousness with broadcast
Consciousness is palpated uncertainty about your own memories and internal states.hypothesis0.825
Extension of Solms's idea: consciousness as freedom from past commitments.
Consciousness is prior to and independent of personal ownership or individual minds.claim0.814
Consciousness is always happening now — it constitutes what we experience as the immediate present; its minimal state contains only the presence of consciousness itself.claim0.806
Paper's phenomenological claim about the temporal character of consciousness
Consciousness (phenomenal consciousness)concept0.805
The state of having subjective experiences; there is something it is like to be the subject.
Consciousness remains without an agreed scientific characterization, without a validated theory connecting mechanism to experience, and without criteria for establishing its presence or absence in any systemclaim0.805
CIMC's characterization of the current state of the field motivating its research program
Consciousness is a phenomenon we have partial sensors for; building better sensors is a research and engineering question.claim0.804