The criteria for concern should not require 2nd order abilities of creatures to reflect on their feelings.

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• Sentience criteria should not require second-order cognitive abilities like reflection on feelings.claim0.869
• What degree of concern and care should we exhibit toward the many diverse agents around us, and what criteria do we use to identify sentience, capacity for suffering, and other properties that have moral implications?question0.811
  Central question motivating the paper.
• We should err on the side of reducing false negatives with respect to sentience criteria for ethical concern.claim0.797
  Ethical precaution advocated by Levin and Crump et al.
• Sentience assessment should seek deep invariants across possible minds, not arbitrary criteria tied to evolution on Earthclaim0.789
  Core normative claim: frameworks must identify fundamental properties of sentience independent of phylogenetic accident or familiar substrates.
• If behaviour is the window to sentience, evaluation criteria must focus on observable response patterns without reference to the means by which they are produced.quote0.776
  Key prescriptive statement supporting the system-agnostic approach.
• What Are The Appropriate Criteria For Assessing Sentiencequestion0.772
• Smith & Boyd (1991) criteria are irrelevant across the vast majority of the space of possible agents.claim0.769
  Dismissal of earlier criteria as too narrow.
• Crump et al. eight criteria for sentiencemethod0.769
  Set of eight criteria: nociception, sensory integration, integrated nociception, analgesia, motivational trade-offs, flexible self-protection, associative learning, analgesia preference.