We should err on the side of reducing false negatives with respect to sentience criteria for ethical concern.

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• Reducing false negatives in sentience attributionconcept0.830
• What degree of concern and care should we exhibit toward the many diverse agents around us, and what criteria do we use to identify sentience, capacity for suffering, and other properties that have moral implications?question0.811
  Central question motivating the paper.
• Sentience criteria should not require second-order cognitive abilities like reflection on feelings.claim0.809
• What Are The Appropriate Criteria For Assessing Sentiencequestion0.799
• The criteria for concern should not require 2nd order abilities of creatures to reflect on their feelings.claim0.797
  Alignment with Crump et al. that metacognition is too high a bar.
• Sentience assessment should seek deep invariants across possible minds, not arbitrary criteria tied to evolution on Earthclaim0.797
  Core normative claim: frameworks must identify fundamental properties of sentience independent of phylogenetic accident or familiar substrates.
• Current double standard applies behavioral criteria for sentience attribution to animals but not to plants or other non-neural systems.claim0.792
• False negatives (ignoring genuine conscious experience in AI systems) carry potentially more severe risks than false positives, as they could constitute direct moral harm scaling with deployment and generate alignment risksclaim0.785
  Ethical argument motivating the research as a first-order priority