Current double standard applies behavioral criteria for sentience attribution to animals but not to plants or other non-neural systems.

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• Double standard in sentience attribution across substratesclaim0.854
  Rouleau & Levin argue: behavioral patterns attributed to sentience in animals should be afforded same interpretation in plants and other systems without neural substrate bias.
• double standard in inferring sentienceconcept0.819
  Unequal willingness to attribute sentience to animals vs. plants despite similar behavioural evidence.
• all attributions of cognition (i.e., mental actions), including sentience, are always inferred on the basis of embodied behaviours, including verbal self-report in humans.quote0.808
  Critical verbatim statement highlighting the universal inference basis of sentience.
• The same charitable interpretation must be extended to all systems that display observable response patterns that are consistent with animal cognition, including artificial intelligences, metaplastic materials, and robotic systems.claim0.808
  Call to extend the inference of sentience to non-biological systems as well.
• Sentience assessment should seek deep invariants across possible minds, not arbitrary criteria tied to evolution on Earthclaim0.805
  Core normative claim: frameworks must identify fundamental properties of sentience independent of phylogenetic accident or familiar substrates.
• All attributions of cognition, including sentience, are always inferred on the basis of embodied behaviours, including verbal self-report in humans.claim0.805
  Stronger version: all cognition attributions rely on observable behavior.
• Although none of these behaviours necessarily require sentience, they are often proposed as evidence of animal sentience because of their subjective correlates in humans.claim0.804
  Acknowledgment that the same behaviours are used to infer sentience in animals despite not proving it.
• Behavioural patterns associated with subjective experiences in humans are considered valid for inferring cognition in non-human animals but not in diverse other systems including plants.claim0.803
  The double standard pointed out by S&C and endorsed by the authors.