question

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question:if-felt-states-in-humans-and-other-animals-are-always-inferred-why-is-the-same-leap-from-observable-behaviour-to-inferred-sentience-not-afforded-to-other-organisms-including-plants

If felt states in humans and other animals are always inferred, why is the same leap from observable behaviour to inferred sentience not afforded to other organisms, including plants?

Central question of the commentary; challenges the double standard in attributing sentience.

Source paper

extracted_from

Multiple ways to implement and infer Consciousness

(2023) · Rouleau, Nicolas · Levin, Michael

Neighborhood — ranked by edge-count

Papers (1)

paper

Multiple ways to implement and infer sentience
mentions

Claims (3)

claim

All attributions of cognition, including sentience, are always inferred on the basis of embodied behaviours, including verbal self-report in humans.
extendsgates
Stronger version: all cognition attributions rely on observable behavior.
Current double standard applies behavioral criteria for sentience attribution to animals but not to plants or other non-neural systems.
gates
The same charitable interpretation must be extended to all systems that display observable response patterns that are consistent with animal cognition, including artificial intelligences, metaplastic materials, and robotic systems.
gates
Call to extend the inference of sentience to non-biological systems as well.

Concepts (1)

concept

Double Standard
associated_with
The inconsistent willingness to infer sentience in animals vs. plants based on similar behavioral evidence.

Events (1)

event

Multiple ways to implement and infer Consciousness (Rouleau & Levin, 2023)
cites
Commentary on Segundo-Ortin & Calvo (2023) arguing for plant sentience via multiple realizability and substrate independence, published in Animal Sentience.

Related by similarity (8)

cosine ≥ 0.65 · no typed edge

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

That animal sentience is inferred on the basis of some likeness to humans is ultimately an intuition.claim0.839
Claim that the basis for inferring animal sentience is intuitive, not empirical.
It is highly implausible that all sentient life in the universe achieves felt states using the neural circuitry underlying human Consciousness on earth.claim0.831
Reinforcement of substrate independence: Earth-like neural circuits are unlikely to be the sole substrate.
Although none of these behaviours necessarily require sentience, they are often proposed as evidence of animal sentience because of their subjective correlates in humans.claim0.827
Acknowledgment that the same behaviours are used to infer sentience in animals despite not proving it.
Behavioural patterns associated with subjective experiences in humans are considered valid for inferring cognition in non-human animals but not in diverse other systems including plants.claim0.819
The double standard pointed out by S&C and endorsed by the authors.
Felt states can be achieved in multiple ways and by many different biological substrates, analogous to how computation is multiply realizable.hypothesis0.818
Foundational hypothesis bridging multiple realizability principle to consciousness; core argument for plant sentience possibility.
Can Plants Achieve Sentience Or Felt States Withoutquestion0.817
It is quite possible that felt states can be achieved in multiple ways and by many different biological substrates.concept0.811
Load-bearing quote summarizing the paper's core hypothesis about sentience substrate independence.
Sentience assessment should seek deep invariants across possible minds, not arbitrary criteria tied to evolution on Earthclaim0.800
Core normative claim: frameworks must identify fundamental properties of sentience independent of phylogenetic accident or familiar substrates.