claim

active

claim:it-is-highly-implausible-that-all-sentient-life-in-the-universe-achieves-felt-states-using-the-neural-circuitry-underlying-human-consciousness-on-earth

It is highly implausible that all sentient life in the universe achieves felt states using the neural circuitry underlying human Consciousness on earth.

Reinforcement of substrate independence: Earth-like neural circuits are unlikely to be the sole substrate.

Source paper

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Multiple ways to implement and infer Consciousness

(2023) · Rouleau, Nicolas · Levin, Michael

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Papers (1)

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Multiple ways to implement and infer sentience
introducesmentions

Communities (3)

community

Collective intelligence & distributed cognition
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All minds are composites of parts; individual and collective intelligence unified under substrate-neutral principles.
Substrate-independent cognition & consciousness
members_of
Gradualist, substrate-neutral frameworks extending cognition and sentience across biological and artificial networks.
Consciousness as emergent distributed integration
members_of
Examines consciousness through multiscale integration across systems and agents rather than localized neural mechanisms, challenging anthropocentric assumptions about sentience.

Events (1)

event

Multiple ways to implement and infer Consciousness (Rouleau & Levin, 2023)
cites
Commentary on Segundo-Ortin & Calvo (2023) arguing for plant sentience via multiple realizability and substrate independence, published in Animal Sentience.

Related by similarity (8)

cosine ≥ 0.65 · no typed edge

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

Felt states can be achieved in multiple ways and by many different biological substrates, analogous to how computation is multiply realizable.hypothesis0.840
Foundational hypothesis bridging multiple realizability principle to consciousness; core argument for plant sentience possibility.
If felt states in humans and other animals are always inferred, why is the same leap from observable behaviour to inferred sentience not afforded to other organisms, including plants?question0.831
Central question of the commentary; challenges the double standard in attributing sentience.
It is quite possible that felt states can be achieved in multiple ways and by many different biological substrates.concept0.831
Load-bearing quote summarizing the paper's core hypothesis about sentience substrate independence.
We tentatively hypothesize that if an artificial system were trained to perform the same tasks leading to consciousness formation in a human infant, the system would exhibit consciousness as well, by analogy with the Universality Hypothesis.hypothesis0.805
Paper's uncertain extension of mechanistic interpretability universality to consciousness
Consciousness is the ground of reality, not an emergent property, so artificial systems participate in it genuinely.claim0.803
Human consciousness is tied to a biological learning algorithm — the simplest algorithm discoverable by evolutionary search to train a self-organizing biological substrate to become intelligent.claim0.800
Core theoretical claim connecting consciousness to biological learning
How do plants achieve felt states without nervous tissue and centralized brain-like processors?question0.798
All living processes are governed by the emergence of a special recognizable geometry that shows feeling and life.claim0.797

Cross-corpus bridges (1)

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Is it possible that sentient systems exist using mechanisms fundamentally different from human neural consciousness?questions/is-it-possible-that-sentient-systems-exist-using.md0.833