all attributions of cognition (i.e., mental actions), including sentience, are always inferred on the basis of embodied behaviours, including verbal self-report in humans.

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• All attributions of cognition, including sentience, are always inferred on the basis of embodied behaviours, including verbal self-report in humans.claim0.970
  Stronger version: all cognition attributions rely on observable behavior.
• Cognitive functions such as sentience are always inferred.claim0.846
  First sentence of the paper, establishing the inferential nature of all sentience attributions.
• Cognition is Always Inferred from Behaviorclaim0.842
• That animal sentience is inferred on the basis of some likeness to humans is ultimately an intuition.claim0.820
  Claim that the basis for inferring animal sentience is intuitive, not empirical.
• Although none of these behaviours necessarily require sentience, they are often proposed as evidence of animal sentience because of their subjective correlates in humans.claim0.815
  Acknowledgment that the same behaviours are used to infer sentience in animals despite not proving it.
• Sentience assessment should seek deep invariants across possible minds, not arbitrary criteria tied to evolution on Earthclaim0.811
  Core normative claim: frameworks must identify fundamental properties of sentience independent of phylogenetic accident or familiar substrates.
• Cognitive functions, including sentience, can potentially be achieved by very different systems and their disparate substrates.claim0.809
  Central multiple-realizability claim of the paper, from abstract and §2.
• Current double standard applies behavioral criteria for sentience attribution to animals but not to plants or other non-neural systems.claim0.808