claim

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claim:iit-is-incompatible-with-computationalist-functionalism-because-phi-is-defined-as-intrinsic-to-physical-causal-structure-allowing-two-functionally-identical-systems-to-differ-in-consciousness

IIT is incompatible with computationalist functionalism because Phi is defined as intrinsic to physical causal structure, allowing two functionally identical systems to differ in consciousness

CIMC's explicit rejection of IIT as operating outside the representationalist and functionalist framework

Source paper

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cimcWhitepaper

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Frameworks (1)

framework

Integrated Information Theory
contradicts
Tononi et al. framework quantifying consciousness via integration; provides mathematical tools for measuring agent complexity.

Related by similarity (8)

cosine ≥ 0.65 · no typed edge

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

If computational functionalism is false, consciousness may be impossible in non-organic artificial systems.hypothesis0.805
Contrapositive possibility acknowledged.
IIT alone cannot serve as a definitive criterion for identifying consciousness in LLM representations due to its panpsychist implications challenging its specificity.claim0.782
Motivates the hybrid approach combining IIT, Span Representation, and multiple criteria.
If computational functionalism is correct, then some computations suffice for consciousness and the question is which ones and when they will exist in AI.hypothesis0.779
Conditional underlying the consciousness route.
It is hard to coherently deny functionalism in any reasonable theory of consciousness, since any theory must tie consciousness to certain configurations, which smuggles functionalism back in.claim0.769
Paper's argument that all viable theories of consciousness implicitly rely on structural-functional criteria
Computational functionalism is plausible and well-supported, so it would be a mistake to dismiss near-future AI welfare solely on the basis of high-level arguments against this assumption.claim0.762
Defense against biological substrate objections.
The absolute or isolated value of any IIT estimate lacks intrinsic meaning; IIT estimates are only interpretable when compared across varying levels or contents of consciousness under consistent contextual conditions.claim0.760
Methodological constraint adopted from IIT literature to justify the comparative experimental design.
Three criteria for consciousness-capable substrates: hybrid computation, scale-inseparability with metabolic embedding, dynamico-structural co-determination.hypothesis0.759
Proposed necessary conditions for any substrate (biological or artificial) to support consciousness; integrates discrete-continuous, multiscale, and adaptive properties.
The Machine Consciousness Hypothesis rests on metaphysical assumptions summarized as computationalist functionalism, which is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the hypothesis.claim0.757
Paper's statement of the metaphysical presuppositions of the MCH