What features of each theory specifically pick out brains as a privileged substrate of inner perspective, or do the features emphasized by the theory occur elsewhere?

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• Consciousness features occur substrate-neutrally across brains, unconventional embodiments, and information-processing systems.claim0.812
• We hypothesize that potential 'consciousness' phenomena are preferentially associated with deeper transformer layers and the 2/3 layer of LLMs.hypothesis0.812
  Derived from observed alignment of promising cases with semantically rich deeper layers and the brain-aligned 2/3 layer.
• "[W]e must confess that perception, and what depends upon it, is inexplicable in terms of mechanical reasons... when inspecting its interior, we will find only parts that push one another, and we will never find anything to explain a perception."quote0.812
  Canonical illustration of the Hard Problem intuition that any functional/mechanical explanation faces an explanatory gap for perception
• "[W]e must confess that perception, and what depends upon it, is inexplicable in terms of mechanical reasons... we will find only parts that push one another, and we will never find anything to explain a perception."quote0.804
  Load-bearing quote from Monadology §17 providing earliest clear statement of the Hard Problem
• If someone develops clear enough introspection, they will eventually conclude that thought is rendered as subtle perturbations in phenomenal fields.hypothesis0.789
  Cube Flipper's prediction about convergence of insight practice on field model.
• Can external observers infer the anatomical goal state of a developing system by observing stress patterns?question0.782
• Neuroscience and mechanistic interpretability have not yet made enough progress to identify neural correlates marking necessary and sufficient conditions of conscious experience in both brains and neural networks.claim0.782
  Paper explicitly identifies this as a current gap requiring alternative experimental approaches
• What I am proposing is that these observations of an observer's inner state are not merely a reflection of a person's attitude or psychology, but can actually be used to measure something real about the external world itself.quote0.782
  Alexander's most radical epistemological claim stated with maximum directness