The features emphasized by theories of consciousness are not unique to brains.

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• The focus on brains as substrate of consciousness is driven by convention rather than by the specific content of existing theories of consciousness.claim0.825
  Central empirical claim: authors surveyed major ToCs and found their operations are not confined to neural substrates.
• Consciousness features occur substrate-neutrally across brains, unconventional embodiments, and information-processing systems.claim0.821
• The operations and functional principles of most contemporary theories of consciousness are not confined to neural substrates.finding0.820
  Primary empirical result from comparative analysis of major consciousness theories.
• Consciousness remains without an agreed scientific characterization, without a validated theory connecting mechanism to experience, and without criteria for establishing its presence or absence in any systemclaim0.811
  CIMC's characterization of the current state of the field motivating its research program
• Most theories of consciousness are already substrate-neutral; neurocentric readings are convention, not content commitment.claim0.811
• Consciousness likely distributed across multiscale body components, not localized to brainclaim0.808
  Organs and tissues employ identical mechanisms as brain; lack of direct verbal report does not negate consciousness in body components.
• Mainstream theories of consciousness are already substrate-neutral at the primitive level.claim0.802
• Even if a case successfully meets all three criteria, this does not necessarily indicate that the corresponding sequence of representations is conscious. Rather, it suggests the observation of a potential 'consciousness' phenomenon within these representations — nothing more.quote0.799
  Load-bearing epistemic caution the author places on the entire analytical framework.