Can digital systems approximate biological computation closely enough that functional equivalence implies experiential equivalence?

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• We hypothesize that adopting computational functionalism as a working assumption allows productive investigation of which computational properties are necessary and sufficient for consciousness and whether current AI systems could implement them.hypothesis0.786
  The paper's core methodological bet: use computational functionalism as a working assumption even while remaining agnostic about its truth
• If computational functionalism is correct, then some computations suffice for consciousness and the question is which ones and when they will exist in AI.hypothesis0.779
  Conditional underlying the consciousness route.
• Different learning systems facing similar computational problems will converge to similar consciousness-like solutions, including potentially biological and artificial systemshypothesis0.774
  Extension of the Universality Hypothesis to consciousness: if consciousness solves a well-defined computational problem, different systems will discover it independently
• If computational functionalism is false, consciousness may be impossible in non-organic artificial systems.hypothesis0.767
  Contrapositive possibility acknowledged.
• Can Evolutionary Connectionism Provide Formal Equivalence Between Learningquestion0.766
• If computational functionalism is true, consciousness in AI systems built on conventional hardware is possible in principle.claim0.764
  Core claim enabling the indicator method's relevance to current AI systems
• No principled limits to functionalization between living systems and inorganic machinery are known; hybrid functional systems can be constructed that are part living tissue and part smart electronics.claim0.763
  Strong claim that hybridization is unlimited in principle, making the life/machine binary conceptually untenable
• will different systems facing similar computational problems converge to similar solutions, including consciousness?question0.752
  Key question for the Machine Consciousness Hypothesis and the universality hypothesis extension