Living Things Are Not (20th Century) Machines (Bongard & Levin, Frontiers 2021)

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• Living things are not 20th-century machines, but may be 21st-century machines.claim0.889
  Core thesis: the machine metaphor requires updating, not abandoning, in light of modern machine behavior.
• The notion of 'machine' used to claim living things are not machines refers to an outdated definition that no longer fits.claim0.779
  First central claim of the paper: the machine concept used in organicist critiques is historically contingent, not essential
• The life vs. machine distinction is relevant only to the lowest class of machines available in prior decades and is not fundamental.claim0.746
  Claim that the organism–machine dichotomy is outdated.
• Modern machines are increasingly interdependent, not independent.claim0.743
  Challenges classical assumption that machines are separate from environment and each other.
• 21st-century machines are increasingly unpredictable and noisy.claim0.734
  Quantum computers, ML systems, and evolved machines exploit uncertainty rather than requiring determinism.
• What is an appropriate definition of 'machine,' and does it apply to all, some, or no living forms across the tree of life?question0.728
  Foundational definitional question motivating the entire paper
• Living cells and tissues are not really machines; but then again, nothing is really anything – all metaphors are wrong, but some are more useful than others.claim0.728
  Concluding pragmatic epistemology: the machine metaphor's value is heuristic, not ontological
• Hybrid bioengineered systems blur distinctions between intelligent machines and conscious life.claim0.728
  Brain-machine interfaces and biological-electronic hybrids demonstrate no principled line between subjectivity and engineering.