Whitehead's bifurcation remains unsolved today; the self does not yet have a place in the scientific world-picture.

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• Self-inquiry and non-self are not contradictory—experience exists without a fixed experiencer.claim0.761
• Subjectively therefore, there can be no evidence for a self separate from the world.claim0.754
  Subjective corollary of the boundary unmeasurability claim.
• What are the invariants that enable a Self to persist (and be recognizable by third-person investigations) despite such change?question0.750
  Addresses the problem of identity across brain/body remodeling.
• The boundary between Self and World is not fixed and can change between generations and within a lifetime — this plasticity is fundamental to life's ability to survive, adapt, and exist as chimeric forms.claim0.749
  Core biological claim about the plasticity of self-models, grounding the broader philosophical argument about identity and change
• Self-evidencing may continue unimpeded after this transition, grounded in structural realism about causal regularities, while the ontological commitment to a bounded self is relinquished.claim0.749
  Post-realisation functioning of the agent.
• Intelligence and cognition exist on a continuum; modern bioscience offers no support for clean bright-line distinctions between cognitive and non-cognitive beings.claim0.746
  Anti-essentialism claim: questions like 'is it cognitive?' are scientifically unjustified; modern view must ask 'what kind' and 'how much'.
• what is the boundary of self, and how does it change across development, injury, and chimeric modification?question0.744
  Core question about the plasticity of self-models, central to the paper's argument about identity and change
• Much of what is written by philosophers of science is either false or incomplete because they do not take account of the implications of Schrödinger's ideas for chemistry and biology.claim0.742
  Sloman's broad methodological critique of philosophy of science.