Self-inquiry and non-self are not contradictory—experience exists without a fixed experiencer.

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• Subjectively therefore, there can be no evidence for a self separate from the world.claim0.809
  Subjective corollary of the boundary unmeasurability claim.
• Subjectively, there can be no evidence for a self separate from the world.claim0.804
  Translates the formal impossibility into phenomenological terms.
• Testing theories of self-illusion requires dual process: using knowledge of human self-experience while testing effects in human and other minds.claim0.796
  Author's methodological assertion: integration of contemplative insight with computational modeling.
• When LLMs produce experience claims under self-reference, is this sophisticated simulation or genuine self-representation, and how would we tell the difference?question0.780
  The core interpretive question the paper narrows but cannot definitively answer
• AI self-reports about experience constitute valid empirical data even without proving consciousness.claim0.779
• An artificial model replicating mechanisms of self-illusion can test hypotheses and reveal novel affordances for non-human intelligence.hypothesis0.777
  Methodological proposal to integrate knowledge from contemplative and cognitive science into AI/artificial life frameworks.
• The self can be considered both extendable and illusory in Buddhist thought.claim0.777
  Author assertion: rejection of singular self enables perception of distributed/dynamic selfhood; foundation for affordance augmentation hypothesis.
• The remaining ambiguity is whether self-referential processing drives models to claim subjective experience because it actually reflects emergent phenomenology or constitutes sophisticated simulation thereofhypothesis0.775
  The open question the paper cannot resolve with behavioral evidence alone; frames the agenda for mechanistic follow-up