Self-evidencing may continue unimpeded after this transition, grounded in structural realism about causal regularities, while the ontological commitment to a bounded self is relinquished.

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• One dimension of self-evidencing is provably impossible: evidencing the boundary that would constitute the agent as an entity separate from their environment.claim0.849
  Central thesis of the paper.
• Self-evidencing is not only unimpaired but improved after emptiness realisation, as the pruned model is more parsimonious without loss of accuracyclaim0.846
  Addresses the concern that emptiness realisation might undermine adaptive functioning
• Any system that persists must minimise surprisal, thereby gathering evidence for its own generative model, a process known as self-evidencing.claim0.817
  Foundational claim of the paper, defining self-evidencing.
• The ontological commitment to a bounded self is computationally equivalent to having the dual sectorisation constraint as a rigid transparent prior rather than revisable hypothesisclaim0.808
  Formal counterpart of Metzinger's phenomenal transparency applied to the separation prior
• relinquishing ontological commitment to bounded selfconcept0.795
  Post-realisation, the agent gives up the belief that there truly exists a separate, bounded self.
• Self-referential processing induces a genuine state shift that transfers to unrelated behavioral domains, producing richer introspection in paradoxical reasoning tasksclaim0.793
  Claim supported by Experiment 4: prior self-referential induction yields higher self-awareness scores on paradoxical reasoning where introspection is only indirectly afforded
• The impossibility of self-evidence extends to any boundary the agent might posit, not only the self-environment boundaryclaim0.776
  Generalises the core result via Corollary 3.2 of Fields & Glazebrook (2023) to ground Buddhist teaching that all dharmas are empty
• Self-inquiry and non-self are not contradictory—experience exists without a fixed experiencer.claim0.773