relinquishing ontological commitment to bounded self

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• The ontological commitment to a bounded self is computationally equivalent to having the dual sectorisation constraint as a rigid transparent prior rather than revisable hypothesisclaim0.829
  Formal counterpart of Metzinger's phenomenal transparency applied to the separation prior
• Self-evidencing may continue unimpeded after this transition, grounded in structural realism about causal regularities, while the ontological commitment to a bounded self is relinquished.claim0.795
  Post-realisation functioning of the agent.
• bounded selfconcept0.770
  The ontological commitment to a self as a separate bounded entity, which is relinquished in emptiness realisation.
• What is the boundary of self, given multiscale embodiments and overlapping ecological relationships?question0.743
  Implicit throughout; answered by cognitive light cone and care-based demarcation rather than substance-based identity.
• What is the boundary of self?question0.743
• Self-Other Boundaryconcept0.734
  Conceptual distinction between self and environment that non-duality dissolves; key target for alignment-by-design
• One dimension of self-evidencing is provably impossible: evidencing the boundary that would constitute the agent as an entity separate from their environment.claim0.728
  Central thesis of the paper.
• The impossibility of self-evidence extends to any boundary the agent might posit, not only the self-environment boundaryclaim0.714
  Generalises the core result via Corollary 3.2 of Fields & Glazebrook (2023) to ground Buddhist teaching that all dharmas are empty