Non-cognitivism does not entail that normative or evaluative judgments are essentially affective states.

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• Pure cognitivism does not imply that all normative or evaluative judgments are emotions.claim0.888
  Defense against pure cognitivist objection.
• Non-Cognitivismframework0.788
  The view that normative/evaluative judgments are not robustly representational but may be analyzed as affective states.
• In every evaluative neural system yet studied, evaluative computation and affective processing are inseparableclaim0.784
  Empirical grounding of the identity thesis across four independent neural systems
• The paper does not claim these models have conscious felt experience; introspection is defined operationally as causal informational coupling agnostic about consciousnessclaim0.756
  Explicit scope limitation following Comsa & Shanahan 2025 and McClelland 2024
• Anatomical goal states cannot be inferred from observation of stress states by an external observer.claim0.753
  Knowledge of morphogenetic goals is inaccessible to external observers; only interior to system itself.
• What I am proposing is that these observations of an observer's inner state are not merely a reflection of a person's attitude or psychology, but can actually be used to measure something real about the external world itself.quote0.752
  Alexander's most radical epistemological claim stated with maximum directness
• Behavioural patterns associated with subjective experiences in humans are considered valid for inferring cognition in non-human animals but not in diverse other systems including plants.claim0.749
  The double standard pointed out by S&C and endorsed by the authors.
• Our central claim is deliberately limited. We do not claim that these models have conscious felt experience, nor that a numeric self-report gives direct access to anything like human phenomenology.quote0.742
  Explicit scope delimitation that situates the paper's claims within interpretability rather than consciousness science