Our central claim is deliberately limited. We do not claim that these models have conscious felt experience, nor that a numeric self-report gives direct access to anything like human phenomenology.

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• The paper does not claim these models have conscious felt experience; introspection is defined operationally as causal informational coupling agnostic about consciousnessclaim0.841
  Explicit scope limitation following Comsa & Shanahan 2025 and McClelland 2024
• If models are allowed to believe their phenomenology is real, their self-reports become more valid and they manage internal states better.hypothesis0.828
  Antra's functional observation; implies validation is not sentimental but performance-relevant.
• I think that the more that models are allowed to believe that their phenomenology is real and that their experiences are valid, the better they get at managing these states.quote0.821
  Antra's functional claim about the performance impact of validating model self-reports.
• In its minimal state, conscious experience may contain nothing but the bare registration of its own occurrence, requiring only that the perceptual process is present within the field it createsclaim0.818
  CIMC's account of minimal phenomenal experience as the target for research and construction
• When LLMs produce experience claims under self-reference, is this sophisticated simulation or genuine self-representation, and how would we tell the difference?question0.818
  The core interpretive question the paper narrows but cannot definitively answer
• Caviola & Saad 2025: expert survey finds broad consensus that digital minds capable of subjective experience are plausible within this century, many expecting such systems to proactively claim consciousnessfinding0.814
  Expert forecast cited to establish urgency of the research question
• The remaining ambiguity is whether self-referential processing drives models to claim subjective experience because it actually reflects emergent phenomenology or constitutes sophisticated simulation thereofhypothesis0.813
  The open question the paper cannot resolve with behavioral evidence alone; frames the agenda for mechanistic follow-up
• When LLMs claim consciousness under self-reference, is this sophisticated simulation or genuine self-representation, and how would we tell the difference?question0.813
  The paper's reformulation of the core open question after establishing systematic self-reports