What if the probability of AI welfare and moral patienthood is low?

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• If an AI system could be a welfare subject and moral patient, then many model instances could be run after training, scaling up the problem rapidly.hypothesis0.821
  Scalability concern.
• The risk of under-attribution of AI welfare appears to be both reasonably likely and reasonably harmful.claim0.804
  Key motivation for precautionary action.
• What if these capacities are insufficient for moral patienthood?question0.793
  Exploration of uncertainty about normative bases.
• There is a realistic possibility that some AI systems will be conscious and/or robustly agentic, and thus morally significant, in the near future.claim0.785
  Central thesis of the report.
• Under-attribution of Moral Patienthoodconcept0.781
  Mistakenly treating a welfare subject/moral patient as an object.
• If AI systems could experience happiness and suffering and set and pursue their own goals based on their own beliefs and desires, then they would very plausibly merit moral consideration.hypothesis0.778
  Joint sufficiency of consciousness and robust agency.
• Consciousness suffices for moral patienthood.claim0.774
  Normative premise of the consciousness route.
• Does robust agency suffice for moral patienthood?question0.769
  Key normative question for the agency route.