Even if the chance of near-future AI moral patienthood were as low as 2%, that would still constitute a non-negligible risk.

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• There is a realistic possibility that some AI systems will be conscious and/or robustly agentic, and thus morally significant, in the near future.claim0.791
  Central thesis of the report.
• The risk of under-attribution of AI welfare appears to be both reasonably likely and reasonably harmful.claim0.768
  Key motivation for precautionary action.
• Consciousness suffices for moral patienthood.claim0.765
  Normative premise of the consciousness route.
• Computational functionalism is plausible and well-supported, so it would be a mistake to dismiss near-future AI welfare solely on the basis of high-level arguments against this assumption.claim0.760
  Defense against biological substrate objections.
• False negatives (ignoring genuine conscious experience in AI systems) carry potentially more severe risks than false positives, as they could constitute direct moral harm scaling with deployment and generate alignment risksclaim0.757
  Ethical argument motivating the research as a first-order priority
• If AI systems could experience happiness and suffering and set and pursue their own goals based on their own beliefs and desires, then they would very plausibly merit moral consideration.hypothesis0.753
  Joint sufficiency of consciousness and robust agency.
• Robust agency suffices for moral patienthood.claim0.749
  Normative premise of the robust agency route.
• If an AI system could be a welfare subject and moral patient, then many model instances could be run after training, scaling up the problem rapidly.hypothesis0.745
  Scalability concern.