Tudge et al. (2016) Model of Division of Labour Evolution

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• Division of Labourconcept0.811
  Role specialization where fitness effects of particle characters reverse depending on context (e.g., germ/soma); formal game-theoretic equivalent to non-linearly separable functions.
• Division Of Labour Gameframework0.772
  Game where individuals adopt complementary heterogeneous roles to maximize collective fitness; game-theoretic equivalent of non-linearly separable function
• Natural selection can evolve phenotypic plasticity that solves division of labour games in two-player collectives (Tudge et al. 2016)finding0.758
  Shows plasticity as solution to HFHF in minimal models with homogeneous genotypes
• Developmental interactions required for evolutionary individuality must be able to coordinate solutions to non-decomposable functions (division of labour games)claim0.757
  Developmental process is identified as computing non-linearly separable collective phenotypes
• Evolutionary units change over evolutionary time and new units arise at new levels of organisation.claim0.743
  Emphasizes the dynamic nature of evolutionary individuality.
• Evolutionary transitions in individuality constitute a form of deep model induction.claim0.734
  Links ETIs to the learning of hierarchical representations.
• Evolutionary transitions to new complex life forms mirror Alexander's levels of scale, each producing new nested centers with division of labor and interdependence.claim0.729
• Most models focus on market-based or state-enforced redistribution rather than voluntary/community-based wealth-sharing mechanisms that existed in pre-modern societies.claim0.728
  Key finding: contemporary economics literature systematically excludes historical voluntary mechanisms.