finding

active

finding:split-brain-patients-and-other-aspects-of-cognitive-neuroscience-demonstrate-that-higher-level-cognitive-processes-lack-infallible-access-to-lower-level-processes-and-construct-plausible-post-hoc-explanations

Split-brain patients and other aspects of cognitive neuroscience demonstrate that higher-level cognitive processes lack infallible access to lower-level processes and construct plausible post-hoc explanations

Cited as empirical evidence that confabulation is universal in biological cognition, not AI-specific

Source paper

extracted_from

AI: a Bridge toward Diverse Intelligence and Humanity’s Future

(2024) · Michael Levin

Neighborhood — ranked by edge-count

Claims (1)

claim

Confabulation is not a distinguishing feature between AI and biological cognition — all cognitive systems confabulate, telling stories based on their world-model without infallible access to lower-level processes.
supports
Directly challenges the use of confabulation as a wedge between AI and genuine cognition

Related by similarity (8)

cosine ≥ 0.65 · no typed edge

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

Neuroscience and mechanistic interpretability have not yet made enough progress to identify neural correlates marking necessary and sufficient conditions of conscious experience in both brains and neural networks.claim0.800
Paper explicitly identifies this as a current gap requiring alternative experimental approaches
Cognitive functions, including sentience, can potentially be achieved by very different systems and their disparate substrates.claim0.799
Central multiple-realizability claim of the paper, from abstract and §2.
The huge chemical complexity within each synapse suggests that neural models of cognition that refer only to changing weights of synaptic connections and ignore sub-neural chemistry are probably ignoring some of the most important explanatory mechanisms in brains.claim0.796
Sloman's critique of mainstream neural network theories.
If different organizations of nervous tissue can achieve the same functions, the possibility that cognitive capacities, including sentience, can be achieved by other tissues should be considered.claim0.786
Conditional claim urging consideration of non-neural tissues for cognition.
Connectionist models of cognition and learning identify conditions where collective intelligence can arise bottom-up, using only distributed learning mechanisms without system-level or global feedback.claim0.782
Central claim about the power of connectionism.
If sub-neural chemical dynamics are crucial for cognition, then neural models ignoring them will fail to capture key cognitive phenomena.hypothesis0.781
Sloman's implicit hypothesis behind his critique of synaptic weight-only models.
Cognitive capacities including sentience can be achieved by non-neural tissueshypothesis0.781
Central hypothesis: sentience is not exclusive to neural systems; other biological substrates may achieve felt states.
The focus on brains as substrate of consciousness is driven by convention rather than by the specific content of existing theories of consciousness.claim0.774
Central empirical claim: authors surveyed major ToCs and found their operations are not confined to neural substrates.